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The subject of products liability is probably the most rapidly expanding area of substantive law at the present time. There are at
least three reasons for this. First, each year more and more manufactured articles, such as automobiles, machinery, household and business appliances, and medical and cosmetic preparations, have high
potentialities for creating serious harm to persons or property. Second,
the arts of advertising, labeling, and packaging have reached such
proficiency that more and more things are being purchased solely on
the reputation and advertising of the manufacturer. Moreover, goods
are frequently packaged in sealed containers, and often the purchaser
does not have the ability, the opportunity, or the desire to make an
inspection of the articles purchased. Third, the masterful and realistic logic of Mr. Justice Cardozo in the famous MacPherson v. Buick
Motor Co. case' in the year 1916 has given to courts and counsel
strong impetus, and in some cases perhaps the necessary courage, to
re-examine previous decisions on the subject.
Before turning to the development of the Florida law on this
subject, a brief survey of some of the underlying principles and current problems is in order. The survey, however, will be confined to
the question of defects in the articles sold; any reference to warranties of title and similar warranties will be omitted, and only occasional mention will be made of the obligations of vendors not connected with defects in articles sold, such as the growing responsibility
to give proper caution and instruction as to the use of the articles.

*John R. Parkinson, B.A. 1919, Yale University; New York University Law
School; Associate member of New York City Bar and member of Volusia County
and Daytona Beach, Florida, Bars.
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LIABILITY FOR DEFECTIVE PRODUCTS

A vendor of personal property may be liable for defects in articles
sold under three doctrines: (1) negligence, (2) misrepresentation,
2
and (3) breach of warranty.
Negligence. Liability for negligence generally relates to the design,
manufacture, or inspection of the article sold; and liability may
attach to the manufacturer or assembler, the wholesaler, the retailer
or last vendor, or to some or all of them, depending upon the facts
of the particular case.
Misrepresentation. The principles of fraud apply to sales of personal property in the same manner in which they apply to any
other type of contract, and there seems to be nothing novel or unique
in the application of the doctrine of fraud to sales of personal property. Fraud will, however, ordinarily give rise to a cause of action
solely to the person to whom the representation was made, and the
remedy has not been extended to third persons in the same manner as
the other remedies. Actually, the distinction between fraud and
breach of warranty may be a very tenuous one, and in cases in which
either theory can be used the breach of warranty theory seems to be
by far the more popular.
Breach of Warranty. An express warranty is based on an agreement or a specific statement, and it supersedes any implied warranties covering the same subject. An implied warranty is a promise or
representation that the vendor is presumed to have made as a matter
of law, under the particular circumstances, in the absence of a binding agreement to the contrary. While Florida has not adopted the
Uniform Sales Act, the provisions of sections 13 through 16 of the
act seem to be a substantially correct statement of the common law
on this subject as followed by the courts in a majority of the states.
A typical example is the provision that when a buyer tells a seller
the purpose for which the goods are being purchased and relies on
the seller's skill and judgment in that connection, there is an implied
warranty that the goods are reasonably fit for the purpose. This is
true regardless of whether the vendor is or is not the grower or the
manufacturer of the goods.
2Brown Cracker & Candy Co. v. Jensen, 32 S.W.2d 227 (Tex. Civ. App. 1930).
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It must be stressed that warranty is an absolute liability and is
not in any way based upon negligence. 3 Since separate counts for
negligence and for breach of warranty are frequently included in
the same action to cover the same situation, courts have sometimes
become confused as to the distinction between these two actions.
They often fail to specify whether a particular action is based on
negligence or breach of warranty, and sometimes erroneously state
that it is necessary to prove negligence in order to hold a defendant
liable for breach of warranty. The distinction between these two
actions is, and should be kept, perfectly clear, even though it is frequently possible to proceed under either or both of these theories
in a particular case.
PROBLEMS THAT ARISE IN PRODuCTs LIABILITY

What is the nature of an action for breach of warranty? Originally,
breach of warranty was considered to be a tort in the nature of
deceit, but it was remediable in assumpsit. When the action of
assumpsit became associated with actions based upon the breach of
a contract not under seal, warranties came to be looked upon as
contracts, and actions for breach of warranty as actions for breach
of contract not under seal. 4 There is a decided tendency at present
to go back to fundamentals and consider actions for breach of war5
ranty as actions for tort in the nature of deceit.
Privity
In the landmark case of MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., the
plaintiff was injured when a wheel of his automobile collapsed. The
question was presented whether one who purchased an automobile
from a dealer could sue the manufacturer because of the manufacturer's negligence in not inspecting a defective wheel which had been
purchased from another manufacturer and incorporated into -the
automobile. Until that case the general rule, with very few exceptions,
was that such an action could not be maintained because there was
no privity of contract or dealing between the plaintiff-purchaser and
the defendant-manufacturer. However, the Court of Appeals of
3Cliett v. Lauderdale Biltmore Corp., 39 So.2d 476 (Fla. 1949).
4SHIPMAN, COMMON LAw PLEADING § §57, 58 (3d ed. 1923).
sSee cases cited in Parish v. Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co., 13 Misc. 2d 33, 177
N.Y.S.2d 7 (N.Y. Munic. Ct. 1958).
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New York in the MacPherson case held that such an action would
lie and that privity was not a requirement. This case is so well known
that further comment is unnecessary except to call attention to the
fact that the case merely held that privity was not required when
the manufacturer was negligent and the article, if defectively made,
could be very dangerous and would probably be used by persons
other than the first purchaser without making any tests or inspection.
This case changed the fundamental thinking on this subject, and
more and more courts have dispensed with the privity requirement
when the action is based on negligence. However, the right to proceed in such cases in the absence of privity is not universal, and in
some jurisdictions it is still narrowly confined to cases involving potentially dangerous objects.
The requirement of privity resisted change even more stubbornly
in the cases based on breach of warranty. Frequently these cases resulted in a wholly illogical and unjust result or required the court
to justify its decision by reasoning that it is difficult to read without
laughing. For example, in one case 6 decided in New York less than
two years ago, two children were injured after eating unwholesome
food purchased at a supermarket, and the children brought action
against the supermarket for the injuries received. There was no
question, except for the defense raised, that the supermarket was
liable for breach of implied warranty of wholesomeness, but the defendant claimed that there was no privity of contract because the
food was not purchased by the children but by their mother. Since
breach of warranty was considered to be an action for breach of contract, and privity was an essential prerequisite to maintenance of an
action for breach of contract, the defense interposed by the defendant
was a formidable one. The trial judge, however, was not a man to
take such an injustice lying down. "They said it couldn't be done,
but he did it." Realizing that he could not lick the obstacles of contract and privity, he joined them. He reasoned that when the mother
bought the food, she bought it for the benefit of herself and the members of her family; therefore, the implied warranty of fitness was a
contract for the benefit of herself and the members of her family under the third-party benefit doctrine. The judge then went on to
inquire whether it would be material if, in addition to the facts noted,
the wife bought the food with money supplied by the husband. He
6Parish v. Great At.

&: Pac. Tea Co., 13 Misc. 2d 33, 177 N.Y.S.2d

7 (N.Y.

Munic. Ct. 1958).
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reasoned that in such cases the husband would be an undisclosed
principal and the wife an agent; and the implied warranty resulting
from the sale to the wife would, in effect, result in an implied warranty running to the husband for the benefit of himself and the
members of his family. The trial judge concluded, in a very scholarly
opinion, that the children were entitled to recover. This illustrates
the mental gymnastics that courts frequently use even now to arrive
at just results.
A more common situation in which the doctrine of privity raises
its ugly head is when the buyer would have a cause of action against
the manufacturer for breach of warranty but for the fact that there
was no privity of contract because he purchased from the retailer
rather than the manufacturer. As a result of situations like this, there
was pressure on the courts to abolish the doctrine of privity in cases
based on breach of warranty. Accordingly, a number of courts have
dispensed with the requirement of privity in breach of warranty
cases, but this has been a slow process, frequently achieved only by
mental gyrations similar to those employed in the supermarket case
mentioned above.
In dealing with the problem of privity in regard to breach of
warranty, some states have merely extended the MacPherson doctrine
to cover breach of warranty cases. A few states have solved the
privity question in warranty cases by going back to the original
doctrine that a breach of warranty is a tort, and holding that privity
is not necessary in an action in tort. An example of this is the famous
Ohio case of Rogers v. Toni Home Permanent Co., 7 decided in 1958.
The plaintiff purchased a home permanent kit from a local store;
the set was labeled "Very Gentle," and the manufacturer had advertised its excellence. She used it carefully, but she lost her hair.
Evidently figuring that she had been scalped, both literally and figuratively, she sought relief in the courts. The supreme court came to
her rescue by holding that labeling and advertising constitutes an
express warranty and that a breach of warranty is an action in tort,
in which privity of dealing is not essential.8 Other courts have held
that actions for breach of warranty are hybrid actions somewhere
between contract and tort.
During the period when the courts of many states were declining
7167 Ohio St. 244, 147 N.E.2d 612 (1958).

sOther courts have also held that advertising creates an express warranty. See
Arfons v. duPont de Nemours Co., 261 F.2d 434 (2d Cir. 1959).
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to give relief in product liability cases because of the technical doctrine of privity and the courts of other states were valiantly striving
to arrive at just results by a process of tenuous and devious reasoning,
the Florida courts were going directly to the point. They have solved
these questions in a logical and just, as well as in a dignified, manner
by holding categorically that privity is unnecessary in these cases regardless of whether they are based on negligence or on breach
of warranty.
Statutes of Limitations
The nature of the action for breach of warranty has other consequences which must be solved, either by categorical statements or
by advancing logical or illogical reasons. One such problem is the
statute of limitations, which in most states seems to be shorter for
tort actions than for ordinary contract actions. The question of the
statute of limitations sometimes presents a serious problem in product
liability cases. This was illustrated by a 1952 case9 decided under the
laws of Connecticut. A boy was injured by a defectively made gun
which was purchased from a local retailer. In a negligence suit against
the manufacturer, the manufacturer pleaded the one-year statute
of limitations covering negligence and claimed that its liability, if
any, was extinguished one year after it manufactured the gun. Unfortunately, the gun was still owned by the retailer at the end of the
one-year period; it was not until several years later that the gun was
sold by the retailer to the ultimate purchaser. The boy was injured
subsequent to that. The court agreed with the defendant, although
one judge filed a vigorous dissent on the ground that a cause of
action cannot be barred before the injury occurs or the cause of
action accrues. The dissenting judge stated, inter alia: 10
"Except in topsy-turvy land, you can't die before you are
conceived, or be divorced before ever you marry ....
For substantially similar reasons, it has always heretofore been accepted, as a sort of legal 'axiom,' that a statute of limitations
does not begin to run against a cause of action before that
cause of action exists, i.e., before a judicial remedy is available to the plaintiff."
9Dincher v. Marlin Firearms Co., 198 F.2d 821,
loid. at 823.
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The reasoning of the majority opinion is still apparently followed
in a few states, but the effect has recently been greatly lessened by
the recognition of a duty to warn as to the existence of defects. This
duty is held to be a continuing one and therefore not subject to any
statute of limitations until the accident happens." Since the Florida
courts have been very skillful in handling certain troublesome questions relating to statutes of limitations, there is no reason to believe
that they will not be able to handle capably situations like the ones
12
just mentioned.
ContributoryNegligence
Even though breach of warranty is tagged as a tort, that does not
logically give the defendant any right to interpose the defense of
4
contributory negligence.'3 However, this appears to be happening.
It seems highly illogical in connection with the issue of liability, although it might logically be very material to the question of damages.
Possibly the courts have become confused by connecting these two
issues, which are entirely distinct though frequently interrelated.
An allied topic is the power of the vendor or manufacturer to
limit his liability by contract or by warnings attached to the articles
or printed in small type on the back of invoices.' 5 Lack of space
forbids further discussion of that topic other than to say that the
effectiveness of such attempts may be influenced by the question of
whether the liability of the vendor is based on negligence or upon
breach of warranty, and, if the latter, whether breach of warranty is
to be considered as a breach of contract, a tort action, or an action
of a hybrid nature.
By way of summary, it will be seen that although the doctrine
of McPherson v. Buick Motor Co. has been responsible for a great
and beneficial change in the law relating to products liability, there
is still a great deal of confusion in a majority of the states and glaring
contrast among the comparatively few settled principles as they are
applied in the various jurisdictions. Happily, Florida has gone to the
forefront of the states that have resolved the questions involved in
lRogers v. White Metal Rolling & Stamping Corp., 249 F.2d 262 (2d Cir. 1958).
(Fla. 1954).
13Davis v. Van Camp Packing Co., 189 Iowa 775, 176 NAV.2d 382 (1920).
14Fredendall v. Abraham & Straus, Inc., 279 N.Y. 146, 18 N.E.2d 11 (1938).
'5See 55 C.J., Sales §698 (1931).
12City of Miami v. Brooks, 70 So.2d 306

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 1959

7

Florida Law Review,
Vol. 12, Iss.
3 [1959],
Art. 1
UNIVERSITY
OF FLORIDA
LAW
REVIEW
this area in a logical and just manner. How this result came about
in Florida is the principal theme of this article.
THE IMPLIED WARRANTY CASES AND THE RULES THEY CONTRIBUTE

The first well-reasoned case in Florida exhibiting judicial expression on implied warranty was Berger v. E. Berger & Co.'6 Lumber
was purchased for resale to a third party, and the seller knew of the
collateral contract and its specifications. The plaintiff alleged that
the defendant knew when he sold the lumber that the buyer was
relying on the seller's judgment to furnish only lumber of merchantable quality for the purpose of filling the collateral contract. After
judgment for the plaintiff, the defendant, among other things, contended that there could be no implied warranty as to quality. The
Florida Supreme Court held otherwise. It reviewed the facts of the
case, including the buyer's lack of opportunity to inspect the lumber,
and held that the exception to caveat emptor, rather than the rule,
applied. The Court quoted Benjamin-t and announced the rule that
has so frequently been quoted in later opinions:' s
"Where a person contracts to supply an article in which he
deals for a particular purpose, knowing the purpose for which
he supplies it and that the purchaser has not opportunity to
inspect the article, but relies upon the judgment of the seller,
there is an implied condition or 'warranty,' as it is called,
that the article is fit for the purpose to which it is to be applied."
Paramount in the Court's consideration were the factors that make
up Rule I on implied warranty: knowledge of the purpose by the
seller, reliance by the buyer, and lack of inspection.
1676 Fla. 503, 80 So. 296 (1918). For other lumber situations in warranty, see
Annot., 52 A.L.R. 1536 (1928). It may be noticed that in this article the following
very old Florida cases have not been commented on for obvious reasons: Walker
v. Gatlin, 12 Fla. 9 (1867) (warranty of slave not broken by act of government);
Kendig v. Giles, 9 Fla. 278 (1860) (nonassignability of warranty of slave's soundness); Hancock v. Tucker, 8 Fla. 435 (1859) (express warranty of slave's soundness);
Croom v. Noll, 6 Fla. 52 (1855) (vendor generally held to have warranted his
title); Lines v. Smith, 4 Fla. 47 (1851) (sale of slave carries implied warranty of
title); Croom v. Shaw's Adm'r, 1 Fla. 211 (1847) (false warranty by agent).

17BENJAMIN, SALES 595 (5th ed. 1888).
1876 Fla. 503, 507, 80 So.2d 296, 299 (1918).
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Rule I. There is an implied warranty of fitness for a particularpurpose when there was knowledge by the seller of the
purpose for which the articlewas bought, the buyer relied upon
the seller's skill and judgment, and the buyer lacked the opportunity to inspect the goods.
Within a year and a half, two other cases added three more rules to
be observed in actions on implied warranty.
Rule II. There will be no implication of warranty in conflict with the express terms of an agreement.
Rule III. When goods are sold by sample, there is an implied warranty that the goods to be delivered will, at least in
quality, equal the goods of the sample.
Rule IV. When goods received are inferior to those ordered
and there is a warranty, express or implied, notice must be
given to the seller or an offer made to return them by the
buyer, unless the goods are entirely worthless.
In Steinhardt v. Consolidated Grocery Co.19 the plaintiff sued for
breach of an implied warranty in the sale of feed called "rice bran"
20
because the feed contained rice hulls in violation of a Florida statute.
Intricacies of the common law pleadings with which most of the
appellate opinion is filled need not be reiterated, but the Court did
announce among other things that "the case as made by the declaration is treated by both parties as if it rests upon an implied warranty which is an inference of law on certain facts, but there will
be no implication of warranty in conflict with the express terms of
2
the agreement." 1
American Mfg. Co. v. A. H. McLeod & Co. 22 was an action by a
seller of rope for the balance of an account, in which the defendantbuyer claimed an offset because the rope was of inferior quality.
There was- a judgment for the plaintiff and an allowance of the set'180 Fla. 531, 86 So. 431 (1920).
20FIa. Laws 1907, ch. 5661.
2180 Fla. 531, 533, 86 So. 431, 43g (1920).
This same elementary point was
made rather firmly in Cohen v. Frima Products Co., 181 F.2d 324 (5th Cir. 1950),
a Florida case, but the court cited Corpus Juris rather than the Florida cases.
2278 Fla. 162, 82 So. 802 (1919).
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off. The Court said that "where goods are sold by sample there is an
implied warranty that the goods . . .will at least in quality be equal

to the sample. ' ' 23 It further held that regardless of whether the warranty is express or implied, when the goods are inferior the buyer
must offer to return them or notify the vendor, or he will be held
to have acquiesced in the breach.
After a lapse of eleven years, McDonald v. Sanders24 added another rule, explaining, modifying, and refining Rule I.
Rule V. There can be no implied warranty of condition,
adaptation,fitness, or quality in a sale of a second-hand article.
This case involved a suit on promissory notes given for the purchase
of a second-hand steam shovel, the agreement being that the shovel
was to have some $1,500 in new parts and to be in "good and workable condition." Upon arrival the buyer noticed a variance in condition, but, after telegraphed assurances from the seller, unloaded
and used the shovel. The plaintiff sought to nail down the defendant's obligation by asserting that the defendant used the shovel
for three months, paid an installment, accepted the offer of a mechanic, and was therefore estopped. The Court, relying on Ruling
Case Law, held that generally there can be no implied warranty of
a second-hand article, although there may be an express warranty.
In its syllabus the Court also noted that the purchaser might thereafter refuse to pay, despite the fact that some payments had already
been made, because there had been no "unqualified acceptance." At
first glance, these statements appear to be new law in implied warranties, and, indeed, the Florida Supreme Court in 1956 so treated it
in Matthews v. Lawnlite Co. 25 However, upon close examination it
can be seen that the rule is really a refinement upon the buyer's lack
of opportunity to inspect. The warranty being "workable condition,"
use of the shovel was really necessary in order to test the warranty.
Nor can it reasonably be said that there was acquiescence in a defect
231d. at 163, 82 So. at 802.
24103 Fla. 93, 137 So. 122 (1931).
2588 So.2d 299 (Fla. 1956). Caveat: the Court referred to Tampa Shipbuilding
& Eng. Co. v. Garretson, 43 F.2d 309 (5th Cir. 1930); Lambert v. Sistrunk, 58 So.2d
434 (Fla. 1952); United States Rubber Products v. Clark, 145 Fla. 631, 200 So.
385 (1941); and McDonald v. Sanders, supra note 23, as cases involving secondhand goods. This appears to be incorrect from the facts given in the appellate
opinions, as only the McDonald case involved second-hand goods.
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when, as in this case, the defect was not discoverable without using
the shovel, even though payments were made until the discovery.
At this point it is well to go backward in time to 1909 to
27
Vaughan's Seed Store v. Stringfellow,26 the first of the "seed" cases.
This case added Rules VI and VII.
Rule VI. A seller of seeds by name impliedly warrants
that the crop shall correspond in kind and quality to the
name of the seed.
Rule VII. The measure of damages for breach of warranty
in the sale of seed is the difference between the value of the
crop that would have been raised if the breach had not occurred. If the seed produces no crop, bearing in mind that
damages cannot be recovered for remote or conjectural consequences, the damages recoverable are the price paid for the
seed, expenses in preparing the soil and planting the seed,
and the loss sustained for having the land lie fallow for a year.
In this case, seeds for "Arlington White Pine" cucumbers were sold,
but they produced cucumbers of such inferior quality that they were
unmarketable. It is interesting to note the closeness of the language
of the Court on the measure of damages to that in Atlanta & St.
A. B. Ry. v. Thomas, 28 to be discussed later. The latter case appeared within a year after the former, and the cases probably parallel
because of the influence of Hadley v. Baxendale.29
The second seed case, West Coast Lumber Co. v. Wernicke,30 despite a vigorous dissent, added still another rule.
Rule VIII. A sale of seed by name raises an implied warranty that the seed is true to its name, despite the fact that the
buyer inspected the seeds; the fact of inspection is immaterial,
since their nature cannot ordinarily be ascertained by inspection.

2656 Fla. 708, 48 So. 410 (1909).
27For a specific seed problem, see Annots., 168 A.LR. 581 (1947); 117 A.L.R.
470 (1938); 62 A.L.R. 451 (1929); 32 A.L.R. 1241 (1924); 16 A.L.R. 859 (1922).
2860 Fla. 412,53 So. 510 (1910).
209 Ex. 341, 156 Eng. Rep. 145 (1854).
20137 Fla. 363, 188 So. 357 (1939).
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In the West Coast case seed had been sold as Texas Seed Ribbon
cane; the charge was that it contained 60% kaffir seed and that the
crop harvested was unfit for ensilage, for which it was intended. The
seed was intermixed, and the Court took notice of, and laid great
stress on, the fact that even an expert would have been hard put to
discover the variance by inspection. An added element of claimed
damages was the fact that the kaffir, when placed in storage, molded
and caused further loss.,"' The Court affirmed the judgment for the
plaintiff and relied on the Vaughan's Seed Store case; the rule of
difference in crop value as the measure of damages was upheld. The
Court also adopted the rule of a Mississippi case, Grafton-Stamps
Drug Co. v. Williams32 -

the sale of seed raises a warranty as to charac-

ter. It was on this latter rule that Phillips v. Beamer 33 affirmed another such judgment for the plaintiff in Florida. The action was
for failure of warranty as to variety and quality of seed. The case,
affirmed in a per curiam decision, adds nothing to the list of rules.
The two remaining seed cases, Hoskins v. Jackson Grain Co.34 and
Corneli Seed Co. v. Ferguson,3 5 added to the law of implied warranty,
but in the interest of chronological development they will be considered later.
In 1940 came the landmark case of Smith v. Burdine's, Inc.,36 in
which the complainant alleged that lipstick which she purchased in
reliance on the recommendation of a sales person proved to be poisonous and injured her health. Count one was upon a theory of
implied warranty of fitness, and count two was sounded on an express
warranty of wholesomeness. The Court, after reviewing Berger v.
E. Berger & Co., Benjamin on Sales, and Williston on Sales, added
another rule.
Rule IX. The existence of an implied warranty of fitness
for a particularpurpose must and necessarily does depend upon
whether the buyer relied upon his own judgment at the time of
the purchase or relied on the skill and judgment of the seller;
it is a fact question for the jury.
3lConsequcntial loss is an important consideration. See discussion under heading "The Measure of Damages" infra.
32105 Miss. 296, 62 So. 273 (1913).
33144 Fla. 769, 198 So. 695 (1940).
3463 So.2d 514 (Fla. 1953).
3:3 Fla. Supp. 144, 64 So.2d 162 (1953).
36144 Fla. 500, 198 So. 223 (1940).
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As a caveat to this rule it should be noted that when the buyer asks
for a product by a trade name, the element of reliance is deemed
destroyed in an action against the retailer but, of course, not against
the manufacturer. This rule is incorporated into the Uniform Sales
Act; 37 but, except for an implication in the discussion of the facts in
the Smith case, no Florida court has made the distinction.
The leading case of Blanton v. The Cudahy Packing Co.,3s the
first of the food cases, established a now well-known principle in the
law of implied warranty in Florida.
Rule X. A manufacturer of food products sold in sealed
containers to retailers for resale is liable to the ultimate consumer for injuries, despite the lack of privity of contract,
on the implied warranty of wholesomeness and fitness for human consumption.
The ultimate purchaser of the defendant's meat products received
a judgment for injuries sustained as a result of the meat's unwholesomeness. The reviewing court was concerned with the question of
whether lack of privity39 would defeat the action in warranty. On
the strongest considerations of public policy, the Florida Supreme
Court considered the authorities, noted the "general trend," and affirmed the judgment for plaintiff. This case is the basis upon which
Florida's far-reaching warranty law is built.
Five years after the Blanton case, Cliett v. Lauderdale Biltmore
Corp.4 0 nailed down the liability in food cases.
Rule XI. A seller of food for value to immediate consumers is absolutely liable for injuries as a result of unwholesomeness of the food on the implied warranty of fitness for
human consumption regardless of negligence, the basis being
the reliance of the consumer on the seller's skill and judgment.
The Cliett case involved a single sale of prepared food in a restau37UNIFORM SALES Act § 15 (4): "In the case of a contract to sell or a sale of a
specified article under its patent or other trade name, there is no implied warranty as to its fitness for any particular purpose."
38154 Fla. 872, 19 So.2d 313 (1944).
39That is,the obstacle to recovery in actions on the liability of the supplier
by third persons. The rule preventing recovery when no privity exists stems from
W. 109, 152 Eng. Rep. 402 (1842).
Winterbottom v. Wright, 10 M. &I
4039 So.2d 476 (Fla. 1949), 3 MIAMI L.Q. 638.
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rant; and, in opposition to the defendant's "service, not sale" argument, 41 the Court literally threw the Blanton case back at the seller,
holding that if there is liability when no privity exists, there is even
greater reason for recovery when there is privity.
The three remaining food cases, Sencer v. Carl's Market,42 Florida
Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. Jordan4 3 and Food Fair Stores, Inc. v.
Macurda,44 made further refinements on the warranty rules in regard to food. In the Sencer case the action was against the retailer,
not the manufacturer, as in the Blanton case; and the defendant
contended that the difference was controlling. The Court disagreed;
and, upon the same considerations of public policy seen in food cases
such as Blanton, held that the implied warranty liability extended to
the retailer of a packaged food product as well as to the manufacturer.
The product involved was canned sardines, and a disturbed dissent 45
pointed out the conflict of authorities on the retailer's similar lack
of actual responsibility for the unwholesomeness. The dissent, it appears, chose to ignore the fact that the retailer selected the manufacturer and probably was governed by the profit motive in so doing.
In the Florida Coca-Cola Bottling Co. case the bottled product had
been obtained from a machine and the drink contained glass fragments. The Court could find no reason, it said, not to apply the
Blanton rule to bottled products also. In the Food Fair case the
offending product involved was canned spinach containing worms.
A verdict for the plaintiff was resisted on appeal by Food Fair (perhaps, to be fair, its insurer), not on the warranty law but upon the
excessiveness of the verdict and on the argument that the plaintiff's
illness, vomiting, and nervous condition were the result of psychological reaction rather than a direct injury from eating the
spinach. It was even suggested as an argument that canned Mexican
worms adorn the shelves of many gourmet shops. The Court failed
to see the luxury of this and, in words so beautiful in their sarcastic
quality that they are worthy of examination, affirmed the judgment.
Placed among the food cases, chronologically, is Lambert v. Sistrunk,46 which contributed another rule.
41See, e.g., Merrill v. Hodson, 88 Conn. 314, 91 At. 533 (1914); Nisky v. Childs,
103 N.J.L. 464, 135 At. 805 (Sup. Ct. 1927); PROSSER, TORTS 672 (1941).
4245 So.2d 671 (Fla. 1950), 3 U. FLA. L. REv. 380.
4362 So.2d 710 (Fla. 1953).
4-93 So.2d 860 (Fla. 1957).
4545 So.2d 671, 673 (Fla. 1950).
4658 So.2d 434 (Fla. 1952). See Survey of Florida Law, 8 MIAMI L.Q. 494 (1954).
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Rule XII. When a common article is sold by a retailer,
other than food products and planting seed, and the buyer
has, by reason of the article's nature, the same opportunity
to inspect as the seller, and the defect is not inherent, there
can be no implied warranty.
The case, however, is of dubious value. The product involved was
a stepladder, in the process of the sale of which the clerk said,
"It is strong." The buyer contended that the Blanton and Smith
cases necessitated recovery on an implied warranty. The Court, in
review, distinguished the cases: first, on the ground that the buyer,
having the same knowledge as the salesman, could have discovered
the defect by inspection; second, the warranty of fitness for a particular purpose did not apply because "the use of a stepladder is
as well known to a buyer as to a seller and is as limited as it is well
known." 47 The case rather defies analysis of its positive place in warranty law.
The pinnacle of modern warranty law in Florida was reached
between 1955 and 1958 with the cases of Matthews v. Lawnlite Co.48
and Continental Copper and Steel Industries Inc. v. E. C. "Red"
Cornelius, Inc. 49 It will be recalled that until 1955 the status of the
privity-unnecessary rule was confined to food products. However, in
the Matthews case of 1955 the offending product was an aluminum
chair. The plaintiff was sitting in the chair and his finger was
severed by a concealed mechanism when he grasped the handle. In
reversing an order of dismissal, the Florida Supreme Court reverted
to MacPherson v. Buick and other authorities and noted that these
cases "have so often departed from or modified the old theory that
an innocent third party who purchases from a retailer cannot sue a
manufacturer because of absence of privity of contract that the doctrine may be said to have been abandoned in many jurisdictions. 50
The case has added a rule to the list.
Rule XIII. An implied warranty does not protect against
hazards apparent to the plaintiff; it protects against an unusual or nonapparent use. It does not protect against injury
imposed while carelessly using a dangerous mechanism.
4758 So.2d 434, 435 (Fla. 1952).

4888 So.2d 299 (Fla. 1956).
49104 So.2d 40 (d D.C.A. Fla. 1958), 13 U. MAMI L. REV. 252.
5088 So.2d 299, 300 (Fla. 1956).
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The Matthews case is extremely significant in the modern Florida
law of warranty. First, as already noted, privity is unnecessary to
sue a remote manufacturer on implied warranty of any product (if
it results in personal injury?) . Second, a careful reading of the
Matthews case will disclose a fusion of negligence and warranty
principles to the point where they are practically inseparable. Does
the Court mean to infer that the presumptions of implied warranties
are to become a part of negligence law so that such things as duty
to others can be established by the rules of warranty? Or that the
defenses to negligence, such as contributory negligence and assumption
of risk, are to become available in warranty law? There is a strong
basis in the opinion for such a belief. 51
There is also some justification after reading the Matthews case
for believing that the reason for extending the privity-unnecessary
rule to aluminum chairs was because of the element of personal injury, a very strong public policy consideration in itself. There might
have been some justification for such a belief, but it ended with the
Continental Copper case. There, the contractor on a government
building project brought an action against the remote manufacturer
for breach of implied warranty of electrical cable. The cable, which
had been underground for eight months, proved to be defective; as
a result, there were several power failures and the cable had to be dug
up. In sustaining a judgment for the plaintiff against the manufacturer, the Third District Court of Appeal reviewed the Blanton case
and the Supreme Court's broadening of the privity rule to the point
where, as in Matthews, it included manufactured articles other than
seed and food. From an analysis of these two cases, it can justifiably
be said that the following rule is the law of Florida today.
Rule XIV. A consumer, ultimate user, or purchaser may
recover from a manufacturer of an article, whether food, seed,
or other product, despite the absence of privity, on an implied
warranty of fitness for a particularpurpose or of wholesomeness
(depending on whether the article is food or otherwise) when
the buyer has relied on the skill and judgment of the manufacturer or seller.
There still remain the other seed cases of Hoskins v. Jackson Grain
5Nor would it be unprecedented. See Nichols v. Nold, 174 Kan. 613, 258 P.2d
317 (1953); Mazetti v. Armour & Co., 75 Wash. 622, 135 Pac. 633 (1913).
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Co. 52 and Corneli Seed Co. v. Ferguson.53 In the latter case the action

was for breach of implied warranty in the sale of watermelon seeds
because the seed did not produce the variety of melons named.
Aside from the now well-established existence of such a warranty,
the case is authority on the matter of disclaimers. The seller had
printed on his invoices and on the bags containing the seed a disclaimer or nonwarranty. The seller gave no warranty, express or
implied, as to quality, description, productiveness, or other matter.
The Court drew a distinction between varietal quality and varietal
kind and held that in the case of kind variance in seeds, the disclaimer was nonoperative. It based the holding upon the fact that in
the case of kind the variation is a latent defect which the buyer cannot ordinarily discover upon inspection, whereas variations in quality
are apt to be caused by improper husbandry; hence another rule.
Rule XV. A disclaimer of warranty cannot operate against
the vendee when defects in the thing sold are latent and cannot be discovered by inspection but only by use.
In Hoskins v. Jackson Grain Co. the action was against a wholesaler for breach of implied warranty of seed in that there was a variety
difference between that sold and that actually produced; this case
added another rule.
Rule XVI. One who purchases items of food or other
products in original packages offered for sale for human consumption or use generally purchases them in reliance upon
the express or implied condition that they are wholesome and
fit for the uses or purposes for which they are advertised or
sold, and any person who is injured or sustains a loss as a result of a breach of the condition may hold manufacturer,
wholesaler, or retailer liable regardless of privity of contract.
The emphasis is added to suggest that the answer to the question
many have asked in recent years - "Can the wholesaler be held under
the privity-unnecessary rule?" - is purported to be answered by the
Hoskins case. Indeed, it would seem a little strange to create this
small island of immunity in warranty law in view of the modern
Florida expressions.
So.2d 514 (Fla. 1953).
633 Fla. Supp. 144, 64 So.2d 162 (1953).
5263
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In the Hoskins case, it should also be pointed out, the Court was
faced with the added element of a Florida statute 4 pertaining to
agricultural or vegetable seed which may have given the Court extra
assurance not available in nonstatute cases. It held that "where one
violates a penal statute imposing upon him a duty designed to protect another he is negligent as a matter of law, therefore responsible
for such damage as is proximately caused by his negligence" 55 it
further held that privity of contract could not affect that responsibility.
Two federal cases have arisen in Florida that should be considered in relation to the law of warranty. In Tampa Shipbuilding
& Eng. Co. v. General Constr. Co. 56 the goods involved were unascertained rock to be used in building a causeway. The case is of
dubious value to the point under discussion, however, because it
preceded Erie R.R. v. Tompkins 57 and therefore may not adequately
reflect Florida law; but it stands for the following proposition:
A sale of a particular pile of unascertained goods, at hand
and capable of inspection, though not by the manufacturer,
and not a product of the seller, supports no implied warranty;
but if unascertained rock is sold for a particular purpose
known to the seller, he is held to have furnished goods suitable
for the purpose.
In the second case, Valdosta Milling Co. v. Garretson,58 a more
reliable one since it occurred subsequent to Erie, there was a complaint in negligence and also one for breach of implied warranty of
fitness of feed for consumption by animals. The feed was alleged
to have contained Paris green, which caused the death of the plaintiff's horses. The court noted that at that time (1954) the courts had
not applied the doctrine of implied warranty of fitness beyond food
cases but that the legislature had, in an act 59 similar to the one involved in Hoskins, made it a misdemeanor to place in commerce

54FLA. STAT.

§578.09 (1957).

5563 So.2d 514, 515 (Fla. 1953).
5643 F.2d 309 (5th Cir. 1930).
57304 U.S. 64 (1937).
58217 F.2d 625 (5th Cir. 1954).
59FLA.

STAT.

ch. 580 (1943) (now amended and known as the "Commercial

Feed Law.")
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feed containing a substance injurious to animals. Judgment for the
plaintiff was affirmed on this compelling basis.60
THE MEASURE OF DAMAGES

Except for the food cases and the seed cases, the extent of losses
recoverable in warranty is not a simple matter. There is a dearth
of law squarely on point in Florida; however, it is believed that
there is enough to make certain assertions.
It must be recalled that the action of warranty, historically speaking, has been an itinerant child of English jurisprudence. It has been
a part of tort, then of contract, and now apparently of tort again.
Its origin and development have teased writers for generations, 61 but
one thing has remained rather clear: the measure of damages for
breach of warranty rather uniformly parallels the measure of damages for breach of contract. 02 The most famous statement of this,
most of which has been applied to warranty in other jurisdictions
and to breach of contract in Florida as well, comes from the English
3
case of Hadley v. Baxendale:6
"Where two parties have made a contract which one of them
has broken, the damages which the other party ought to receive
in respect of such breach of contract should be such as may
fairly and reasonably be considered either arising naturally,
i.e., according to the usual course of things, from such breach
of contract itself, or such as may reasonably be supposed to
have been in the contemplation of both parties, at the time
they made the contract, as the probable result of the breach
of it."
The Florida Supreme Court adopted this statement in Atlanta
GoThe case of Johnson v. Dichiara, 84 So.2d 537 (Fla. 1955), was designated as
a case of implied warranty by the reporter, but upon closer examination it would
appear to be one of express warranty. The action was in equity to foreclose on
ice machinery. It was treated under equity rules by the reviewing court and
does not seem to add anything to warranty law.
olSee, e.g., 1 WILLSTON, SALES §197 (2d ed. 1924); Ames, History of Assumpsit,
2 HARv. L. REv. 1 (1888); Jennings, The Implied Warranty Theory of Liability
Recently Adopted in Florida, 28 FLA. L.J. 46 (1954); 1 U. FLA. L. REv. 470 (1948).
62See 9 FLA. JuR., Damages § §25, 38, 78 (1956).
639 Ex. 341, 354, 156 Eng. Rep. 145, 151 (1854).
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& St. A.B. Ry. v. Thomas,64 a breach of contract case in which the
defendant failed to establish a train station as agreed and the plaintiff sought damages for the decrease in the value of his land as a
result of the breach. It was also adopted in another leading case,
Twyman v. Roell,65 which involved a farming contract.
There can hardly be a serious question as to the propriety of
applying the same measure of damages for breach of warranty as for
breach of contract, even though the Florida courts have not expressed
themselves precisely on point. 66 It should be remembered, however,
that the Court in the previously noted case of Vaughan's Seed Store
v. String!ellow61 established a rule for the measure of damages in
warranty, for seed cases at least, that fits the Thomas and Twyman
rule very snugly. In summary, it can be said that the measure of
damages for breach of warranty is that loss which arises naturally
from the breach or which was, or could reasonably be presumed to
have been, within the contemplation of the parties at the time of
the contract or sale. It may include profits prevented, as long as
they are not too remote or conjectural, and losses which are rendered
certain by the evidence.
It may be noticed from reading the cases that the courts are concerned with the element of certainty. The Twyman case somewhat
cleared up the matter: "The uncertainty," declared the Court,
"which defeats recovery . . .has reference to the cause of the damage
rather than to the amount of it."68 By way of dicta, it also held that
the rule with reference to prospective profits applies regardless of
whether the contract in question is a farming, mechanical, or other
contract.
The Thomas case provided a distinction that is rather important
in Florida: When the loss sustained is a necessary result of the breach,
the result is presumed to be within the contemplation of the parties.
In that case, the expense of building a road to the place where the
depot actually was located and the expenses of hauling to that depot
were presumed to have been within the contemplation of the parties.
Such expenses, the Court held, were reasonably capable of being
ascertained. Losses that naturally and probably but not necessarily
result, however, may be found to have been within the contemplab160

Fla. 412, 53 So. 510 (1910).

5123 Fla. 2, 166 So. 215 (1936).
66See Annot., 28 A.L.R.2d 591 (1952).
6756 Fla. 708, 48 So. 410 (1908).
68123 Fla. 2, 7, 166 So. 215, 218 (1936). (Emphasis added.)
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tion of the parties. On this basis the Court viewed the previously
mentioned depreciation in land as not a necessary result but considered that such a loss could not, as a matter of law, be declared not
to be a natural and probable result -another way of saying that it
was a fact question for the jury. The case was returned for a new
trial and a determination of the damages in accordance with the
rules laid down in the opinion. The Thomas and Twyman cases
9
are good law today, having been followed on these points ever since.6
At least in breach of contract, there is no doubt as to the right to
recover for lost profits; there should be no doubt in the warranty
cases.
The prime difficulty in determining damages is the perennial
problem of proof. Damages for loss of profits were recovered as
early as 1936 and perhaps even earlier in Florida. In the case of New
Amsterdam Casualty v. Utility Battery Mfg. Co.70 the action was on
a receivership bond, and loss of profits was recovered. In 1956, the
dismissal of an action by a dentist against a telephone company for
losses to his practice as a result of listing his number incorrectly was
reversed with the clear announcement that such losses could be found
by a jury to have been within the contemplation of the parties.7"
These examples should dispel many of the fears about the recovery
of lost profits in Florida being too remote.
Damage to business reputation - loss of good will - is well within
the Thomas and Twyman expressions and for a long time has been
recoverable in other jurisdictions. 72 A recent example of this is an
Arizona case, Isenberg v. Lemon,7 3 in which both lost profits and loss
of good will were involved. A painting contractor sued a manufac69The Thomas rule was followed in State ex rel. Peters v. Hendry, 159 Fla.
210, 31 So.2d 254 (1947); Farrington v. Richards, 153 Fla. 897, 16 So.2d 158 (1944);
Woods-Haskins-Young Co. v. Dittmarr, 102 Fla. 1000, 136 So. 710 (1931); Hazen
v. Cobb, 96 Fla. 151, 117 So. 853 (1928); Armstrong v. Seaboard Air Line Ry., 85
Fla. 126, 95 So. 506 (1922).
The Twyman rule was followed in Krohne v. Orlando Farming Corp., 102
So.2d 399 (Fla. 1958); Harvey Corp v. Universal Equip. Co., 158 Fla. 644, 29
So.2d 700 (1947); A. J. Richey Corp. v. Garvey, 132 Fla. 602, 182 So. 216 (1938).
70122 Fla. 718, 166 So. 856 (1935).
7"Augustine v. Southern Bell Tel. 8- Tel. Co., 91 So.2d 320 (Fla. 1956).
72See, e.g., Heller v. Suifrin, III F. Supp. 364 (W.D. Pa. 1953); Stott v. Johnson,
36 Cal. 2d 864, 229 P.2d 348 (1951); Grupe v. Glick, 26 Cal. 2d 680, 160 P.2d 832
(1945); California Press v. Stafford, 192 Cal. 479, 221 Pac. 845 (1923); De Rose v.
Hunter Lindsay Corp., 124 A.2d 349 (N.J. 1956); Royal Pioneer Paper Box Mfg.
Co. v. De Jonge, 179 Pa. Super. 155, 115 A.2d 837 (1955).
73327 P.2d 1016 (Ariz. 1958).
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turer in warranty for those losses as a result of using the defendant's
defective paint. A substantial judgment for the plaintiff was reversed for a new trial to clarify the matter of damages. Although
comparable cases cannot be found in the Florida reports, this is not
to say that such damages have not been recovered. Actually the converse is true. The fact that such cases have been settled before or
during trial very soundly indicates the validity of the belief that
the measure of damages is the same as in contract. An obvious reason
for the paucity of judicial expression on point is that Florida is only
now becoming industrialized and confronted with mercantile and industrial warranty disputes.
WARRANTY INSTRUCTIONS

One of the great problems in trying a case in implied warranty
is that of proper instructions to the jury. Of course the usual civil
trial instructions of a general nature are rather standard as to such
items as burden of proof, weight to be given testimony, and the like;
such articles as "Oaths and Standard Charges to Jury in Civil,
Eminent Domain and Capital Cases in Florida"'7 4 by Justice Barns,
Judge Holt, and Gerard Ehrich should be consulted on these matters.
Certain kinds of warranty instructions are adequately set out
in sections 1441, 3111, 3112, and 3113 of Florida Jury Instructions.75
These cover matters such as the nature of an implied warranty in
general, a manufacturer's or dealer's implied warranty of fitness for
a particular purpose, and a general treatment of the measure of
damages for breach of contract. However, it is difficult to find satisfactory instructions covering the matters of damages for lost profits
and damage to good will. The language of the opinions in the
Thomas and Twyman cases would seem to provide adequate authority
for an instruction to a Florida jury in the following form:
When there has been a breach of warranty or contract, the
loss which must necessarily result from the breach is presumed
to have been within the contemplation of the parties at the
time of the making of the contract; and the plaintiff is entitled to recover for such a direct and necessarily resulting loss.
When the loss is not the necessary result of the breach but a
747 MIAMI L.Q. 147 (1953).
75RICHARDSON, FLORIDA JURY INS'IRUCTIONS
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natural and probable consequence or result of the breach and
you find that the consequence was within or should have
reasonably been within the contemplation of the parties at
the time of the transaction, the plaintiff is entitled to recover
for that loss also.
This language should have enough clarity to be meaningful to
the jury. It is also believed that section 3113 of FloridaJury Instructions should be modified in each particular case. In the case of a
boat manufacturer, for instance, section 3113 would be as follows,
the modifications appearing within the brackets:
If you shall believe from the evidence that the defendant
sold the lumber in question to the plaintiff for the specific
purpose of [the manufacture or building of boats for sale to
third persons] and this fact was made known to the defendant,
who thereupon represented to the plaintiff that [boats could
properly be made or constructed from the lumber of the defendant] and that the plaintiff did not [or could not, due to the
inherent nature of the lumber] inspect the stock but relied
upon the statement or representation of the defendant to the
effect that the lumber would meet the dimensions and specifications of [boat plans] and was thereby misled to his financial
injury then your verdict should be for the plaintiff.
The authority for this is Berger v. E. Berger & Co. A specific case
from Missouri, and a leading one, on the precise point of supplying
76
lumber to a boat manufacturer is Antrim Lumber Co. v. Daly.
Individual cases will necessitate different modifications, but the
essential elements must be preserved, that is, the sale, the knowledge
by the seller of the purpose, the reliance by the buyer upon the
seller, the lack of opportunity to inspect, and the representation as
to the propriety of using the particular product. This instruction
should follow closely behind the broader language of section 3112,
so that the jury will be compelled to relate the two to the situation
involved.
"Nothin' but a houn' dog"
Fortunately for the lawyer's sanity, cases are periodically en70190 S.W. 971 (Mo. App. 1916); see Annot., 52 A.L.R. 1536 (1928).
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countered, either in practice or research, that have an aspect of the
offbeat, the unusual, or the humorous. The "houn' dog" case of
Brown v. Faircloth77 is such a case, and it would be thoroughly
enjoyable but for the sobering fact that this particular hound was a
bird dog that set the buyer back $3,000. The action by the buyer
was for rescission, and although the case does not provide any
Florida warranty law of the Blanton or Cornelius magnitude, it does
contain some useful Florida authority and especially exemplifies the
troublesome matter of instructions.
The principal bone of contention was whether the dog was a
"three hour" dog, the animal having been bought for the express
purpose of competing in field trials. The defendant admitted the
representation that the animal was a "three hour" dog but contended
that this meant merely a capacity to run for three hours, not the
ability to run for three hours in field trials with such speed as could be
expected to win, and to demonstrate other abilities peculiar to the
sport. The judgment was for the plaintiff; the defendant appealed to
the Supreme Court of Florida on the ground that the trial court committed prejudicial error in charging the jury. The instructions contained a charge on an implied warranty of fitness for a particular
purpose, whereas the action was on an express warranty. The trial
court, on motion for a new trial, admitted that the implied warranty
instructions were "improvidently given," but in denying the motion
it considered the whole charge and the fact that no warranty was
included other than that alleged under the express warranty; therefore the express warranty under the charge included the defined implied one. The Supreme Court adopted this reasoning and affirmed.
This case should not be dismissed in any study of warranty law.
Had the instruction on implied warranty been outside the express
warranty allegations and charge, the Court would undoubtedly have
been forced to reverse the judgment. The rule of Steinhardt v. Consolidated Gro. Co.78 must be kept in mind: "[Tihere will be no implication of warranty in conflict with the express terms of the agreement." Whatever one may think of the effect of instructions upon
juries, in the prosecution of cases the prospect of a reversal must be
kept in mind when instructions are drafted.
7766 So.2d 232 (Fla. 1953).

7880 Fla. 531, 535, 86 So. 431, 432 (1920).
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265
CONCLUSION

Every defect in an article sold does not give rise to a cause of
action, but when a client has been injured because of a defect and
he has a cause of action based thereon, there is no reason why adequate damages should not be sought. Frequently the party liable
will be found to be covered by product liability insurance. Conversely, the attorney may render a valuable service to a client who is
a manufacturer or vendor by calling to the client's attention the
importance of seeing that his products and practices conform to
proper standards and that he considers the advisability of product
liability insurance as an additional measure of protection. The field
of law discussed in this article is of great importance to the legal
profession in this state, and it will undoubtedly become even more
important as Florida grows in industrial production.
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